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COMPELLING LESSONS IN THE FIRST 
AMENDMENT 
FREE SPEECH, "THE PEOPLE'S DARLING 
PRIVILEGE": STRUGGLES FOR FREEDOM OF 
EXPRESSION IN AMERICAN HISTORY. By Michael 
Kent Curtis.1 Duke University Press. 2000. Pp. 512. $34.95. 
Wilson Huhn2 
Michael Kent Curtis summarizes his book, Free Speech, 
'The People's Darling Privilege': Struggles for Freedom of Ex-
pression in American History, in these two sentences: 
In the free speech controversies over the Sedition Act, slav-
ery, and Civil War, most victories for free speech were not 
won in the courts. Instead, they were won in the forum of 
public opinion: free speech victories were won in elections 
that repudiated the Sedition Act; in Northern legislatures that 
refused to pass laws to silence abolitionists; in Congress, when 
it refused to pass the postal ban on antislavery literature and 
when it finally repealed the gag rule that prohibited congres-
sional discussion of the abolition of slavery and in popular 
protests over suppression of antiwar speech that curtailed 
Lincoln administration reprisals against dissenters. (p. 417) 
Curtis describes, in great detail, the conflicts over freedom 
of speech that engaged Americans throughout the first half of 
the 19th Century. As Curtis notes, these controversies over free 
speech for the most . part were not undertaken in the courts. 
Throughout the antebellum period the federal courts largely 
failed to enforce the First Amendment against actions of the 
federal government, and in 1833 the Supreme Court held that 
the provisions of the Bill of Rights were not applicable against 
the States.3 Freedom of expression, which the author says "had 
I. Professor of Law, Wake Forest University School of Law. 
2. B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; Professor of Law, 
University of Akron. 
3. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833) ("These [proposed] amend-
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to be struggled for again and again and again" (p. 116), was not 
won in the courts, but was gained in election campaigns, in the 
legislatures, in community meetings, on the battlefield, and on 
the streets. In this thorough and readable work Curtis reveals 
the roots of popular American beliefs on freedom of speech, and 
thereby contributes to our understanding of the original meaning 
of the First Amendment. 
This volume is emblematic of the growing awareness among 
constitutional law scholars that it is not sufficient to simply study 
what the Supreme Court has said about the meaning of the Con-
stitution. Because the Constitution speaks in broad phrases-
"due process of law," "equal protection of the laws," "freedom 
of speech"- it is necessary to read meaning into the Constitu-
tion. This interpretive process requires us to determine what the 
fundamental values of our nation are, and, in instances where 
those fundamental values conflict, we must weigh one value 
against another. This meaning must be found in the words and 
actions of generations of Americans as they have confronted one 
crisis after another and as a result have forged compromises be-
tween the rights of individuals and the needs of ordered society. 
Lawyers are trained in the forms of legal argument. As a re-
sult, constitutional law professors are adept at teaching students 
how to analyze constitutional text and how to follow or distin-
guish Supreme Court precedent. However, many of us are not 
cognizant of the history and traditions that give meaning to our 
fundamental freedoms. Michael Curtis' book fills a portion of 
that gap. 
Curtis traces the "struggles for freedom of expression" in 
three contexts: the adoption and ultimate rejection of the Sedi-
tion Act of 1798; the attempt to suppress anti-slavery agitation 
between 1830 and 1860; and the military suppression of antiwar 
views in 1863 under the Lincoln administration. 
The early chapters provide a brief historical review of free-
dom of speech in England and in America during the colonial 
period, including the free speech efforts of Sir Edward Coke, the 
Levellers, John Lilborne, John Peter Zenger, and John Wilkes. 
In the concluding chapters, Curtis draws parallels between the 
struggles of the antebellum period and the major free speech 
conflicts of the 19th and 20th Centuries. For example, he sees 
ments demanded security against the apprehended encroachments of the general gov-
ernment-not against those of the local governments."). 
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the roots of NAACP v. Alabama4 and New York Times v. Sulli-
van,5 which arose from attempts to silence the civil rights move-
ment in the 1950's and 1960's, in the Sedition Act and in the at-
tempts of the southern states to suppress antislavery speech a 
century earlier. (pp. 410-413) 
The emotional and thematic core of the book, and approxi-
mately half of its contents, describe the attempts by northern 
mobs and southern legislatures to silence the antislavery move-
ment. (pp. 116-299) This portion of the book contains a number 
of compelling stories, describing, for example, the persistence of 
John Quincy Adams fighting the gag rule in the House of Repre-
sentatives, the courage of Elijah Lovejoy pressing the antislavery 
message at the risk of his life, the emancipation debate of 1832 in 
the Virginia legislature, and the trials of William Lloyd Garrison 
and Daniel Worth. The heroism of the antislavery advocates jus-
tify the accolade that Justice Louis Brandeis accorded the gen-
eration of the Revolution: "Those who won our independence 
by revolution were not cowards. "6 
Curtis presents the events leading to the Civil War in a First 
Amendment context: the South suppressed antislavery speech 
(pp. 291, 295), and demanded that the North should do the same, 
while elements in the North eventually demanded that the South 
should become an open society. (pp. 279, 281, 284, 285, 286, 289, 
297) Curtis also links the dispute over antislavery speech to the 
other free speech disputes of the period. The suppression of an-
tislavery speech is presented as a form of sedition law (p. 299), 
while the meaning of the Vallandigham case takes on added sig-
nificance because of the country's previous experiences in the 
sedition and antislavery disputes. (p. 356) Curtis states that as a 
result of these conflicts many Americans came to recognize that 
the free speech rights of all citizens must be respected, and that 
this recognition would "light the way for future generations." (p. 
356) 
The stories that Curtis tells resonate with events of the 20th 
and 21st Centuries. The killers of Lovejoy are cut from the same 
cloth as the killers of civil rights leaders. Those who burned 
down the abolitionist forum, Pennsylvania Hall, now burn down 
abortion clinics. The military prosecution of Clement L. Val-
4. 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (invalidating state law that required the disclosure of the 
names and addresses of members of the NAACP). 
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (protecting clergymen and newspaper from libel claim aris-
ing from published criticism of public officials). 
6. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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landigham for his writings against the Civil War presages the 
current detention of Yasser Esam Hamdi, an American citizen 
being held in military confinement in the war on terrorism. 7 
Part I of this review describes a number of themes in First 
Amendment law that The People's Darling Privilege speaks to. 
Part II argues that our study of the First Amendment would 
benefit from a more thorough appreciation of this Nation's his-
tory. 
I. SIXTEEN FIRST AMENDMENT LESSONS FROM 
THE PEOPLE'S DARLING PRIVILEGE 
This book contains a valuable compendium of historical 
evidence regarding dozens of aspects of First Amendment doc-
trine. Curtis has collected hundreds of speeches, laws, resolu-
tions, petitions, and editorials that relate what ordinary Ameri-
cans thought about freedom of speech and press in the early 
years of our republic. Here is a sampling of sixteen points of 
First Amendment law that are informed by Curtis' research and 
analysis. 
1. POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY DEPENDS UPON FREEDOM 
OF SPEECH. 
In the United States, the people are sovereign. That is the 
very definition of a republic. Our nation was founded upon the 
principle that governments "deriv[e] their just powers from the 
consent of the governed."8 Pursuant to this principle, our Consti-
tution and statutes must be interpreted in accordance with the 
intent of the people who enacted them into law. 
But without free access to information, people are unable to 
learn of abuses or to intelligently define their own wants and 
needs. (p. 90) Without freedom of speech and press people can-
not persuade others, form alliances, or organize political parties. 
Curtis describes how the Sedition Act of 1798 prohibited criti-
cism of Federalist officers, the gag rule in Congress and laws in 
southern states prevented open discussion of slavery, and mili-
tary orders during the Civil War attempted to suppress anti-war 
sentiment. A common reaction to all three of these restrictions 
was that limitations on freedom of speech were, in effect, limita-
7. See Charles Lane, Debate Crystallizes on War, Rights: Courts Struggle Over 
Fighting Terror vs. Defending Liberties, Washington PostAl (Sept. 2, 2002). 
8. Declaration of Independence (1776). 
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tions on the right of the people to govern themselves. (pp. 68, 69, 
90,96, 192,234,323,324,349) 
A closely related principle is that in a republic, the people 
are the masters of the government. This precept is described in 
the next paragraph. 
2. GOVERNMENT MAY NOT CENSOR THE PEOPLE BECAUSE 
THE PEOPLE ARE SOVEREIGN. 
At the core of constitutional law is the concept that the con-
stitution is a law and that it is a law that is superior to mere stat-
utes.9 In The Federalist Number 78, Alexander Hamilton ex-
plained this principle by characterizing the relation between the 
people and their government as one of principal and agent: 
No legislative Act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can 
be valid. To deny this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is 
greater than his principal; that the servant is above his master; 
that the representatives of the people are superior to the peo-
IO pie themselves .... 
The implication for freedom of expression is that just as an 
agent may not silence the principal, the government may not si-
lence the people. In the early years of the Republic this meta-
phor captured the imagination of a number of Americans. (pp. 
73,97, 100, 195,325,348) 
3. THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION OF 1787 CONTAINS 
PROVISIONS PROTECTING FREEDOM OF SPEECH. 
A common antifederalist objection to ratification of the 
Constitution was that it lacked a bill of rights. (p. 56) Curtis 
points out, however, that the original Constitution contained 
significant textual protection for freedom of speech. First of all, 
the Speech or Debate Clause immunizes Members of Congress 
for any statements made "in either House. ,II (p. 69) Immunity 
for legislative debate would be expected in a society where the 
legislature is sovereign, as Parliament was in England. In the 
United States, where the people are sovereign, it was argued that 
9. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (stating that the Constitution is 
the "fundamental and paramount law of the nation"). 
10. Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist, Number 78, (McLean, ed.), at <http:// 
Icweb2.loc.gov/const/fed/fedpapers.htmi> (last accessed November 20, 2002). Curtis 
traces this agency theory to the Levellers in 17th Century England. (p. 33) 
II. "(A]nd for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned 
in any other Place." U.S. Const., Art. I,§ 6, cl. 1. 
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this legislative immunity should be extended to individual citi-
zens. (pp. 70,100,175, 195) 
Another significant protection for Freedom of Speech con-
tained in the body of the Constitution is the limited definition of 
"treason" contained in Article III: "Treason against the United 
States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in ad-
hering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort."12 (p. 50) 
James Madison noted that prosecutions for treason had been 
"the great engines by which violent factions ... have usually 
wreaked their alternate malignity on each other," and that the 
limited definition of treason "opposed a barrier to this peculiar 
danger. "13 The limited definition of treason was important be-
cause those who supported the Sedition Act of 1798 considered 
dissenting speech to be "treasonous." (p. 62) As one pro-
government newspaper announced, "It is traitorous to be doubt-
ful." (p. 61) Advocates of antislavery views invoked the narrow 
definition of treason in the Constitution to support their right to 
speak (p. 194), and after Clement L. Vallandigham was prose-
cuted for making antiwar speeches, both Democratic and Re-
publican sources noted that criticism of the war was not treason. 
(pp.326,347) 
4. FREEDOM OF SPEECH MAY BE THREATENED AS MUCH BY 
PRIVATE ACTION AS IT IS BY PUBLIC ACTION. 
Although the Constitution does not directly apply to the 
acts of private individuals, when some members of society vio-
lently attack speakers because the speakers are expressing views 
they disagree with, freedom of expression suffers just as surely as 
if the government had outlawed the speech. Curtis cites many 
instances where newspapers or political leaders instigated or 
condoned mob violence to silence the antislavery movement. 
(pp. 140, 141, 142, 145, 146, 148, 149, 206, 219, 222, 246, 249) 
These leaders rationalized mob violence with the claim that 
mobs were "beyond the reach of human law" (p. 222) or that the 
mob should be praised for having "exerted a vigor beyond all 
law." (p. 141) The instigation to mob violence eventually evoked 
the response that in a democracy law is the expression of the will 
of the people, and that any individual or group who takes the 
12. U.S. Const, Art. III,§ 3, cl. 1. 
13. James Madison, The Federalist, Number 43 (cited in note 10) (last accessed No-
vember 20, 2002). 
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law into its own hands is subverting democracy itself. (pp. 207, 
233,235,247,250,255) 
The most compelling story in Curtis' book is that of Elijah 
Lovejoy, the abolitionist editor who was shot defending his press 
from a mob in Alton, Illinois, in 1837. (pp. 216-240) Shortly be-
fore his death, after mobs had repeatedly threatened him and 
destroyed earlier presses, Lovejoy delivered an impassioned 
speech asserting his "right freely to speak and publish my senti-
ments." (p. 239) Lovejoy added, "I have asked for nothing but to 
be protected in my rights as a citizen." (pp. 227, 239) Curtis re-
ports that Lovejoy's death "produced an immense public reac-
tion" (p. 227) that led to a transformation in the way that 
Americans regarded both slavery and freedom of speech. (pp. 
241-270) In particular, both before and after Lovejoy's death 
there were many calls for the protection of speakers and pub-
lishers. (pp. 192, 226, 239, 258) Lovejoy's murder was the catalyst 
for Abraham Lincoln's first public address, the speech to the 
Young Men's Lyceum, in which he denounced mob rule and 
proposed that obedience to the law should become the "political 
religion of the nation. "14 Many Americans eventually came to 
believe that government owes a duty to all citizens to protect 
them from private interference with the exercise of their rights.15 
In modern times there are many examples of private action 
to subvert others' fundamental rights, including acts by the Ku 
Klux Klan. (219) The most sustained contemporary effort in this 
regard is the campaign of violence and intimidation that many 
members of the anti-abortion movement have waged against 
doctors, staff and patients of abortion clinics. In spite of the his-
torical abuses and serious present danger of vigilantism, the Su-
preme Court has still not recognized that the American govern-
ment has a constitutional duty to protect citizens from private 
action. 16 However, the principle of affirmative protection has 
been incorporated into First Amendment doctrine in a more lim-
ited sense. As Justice Black noted in dissent in 1951, before po-
lice officers may arrest a speaker who is inciting a crowd against 
14. Address Before the Young Men's Lyceum of Springfield, Illinois (January 27, 
1838), at Roy Basler, ed., Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 112 <www.hti.umich. 
edu/l/lincolnl> (last accessed November 20, 2002). 
15. As Senator Lyman Trumbull stated, "Allegiance and protection are reciprocal 
rights." Cong. Globe, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 1757 (1866). 
16. See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Depanment of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189 
(1989) (holding that the state was not liable for injuries inflicted by a father upon his 
child, even though the abuse had been reported to and was being investigated by case-
workers). 
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him, "they first must make all reasonable efforts to protect 
him." 17 Black's view was implicitly adopted by the Court in a trio 
of cases18 from the 1960's where the Court ruled that demonstra-
tors could not be arrested for disturbing the peace where "police 
protection at the scene was at all times sufficient to meet any 
foreseeable possibility of disorder" 19 or where officials "could 
have handled the crowd. "20 
5. THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT UNDULY RESTRICf ACCESS 
TO THE PUBLIC FORUM OR TO THE MEANS OF MASS 
COMMUNICATION. 
In the 20th and 21st Centuries the Supreme Court decided a 
number of cases involving restrictions upon various modes of 
communication. Some of these cases involved restrictions on the 
places where communication could take place, such as the streets 
of a company town/1 airports/2 or door to door solicitation.23 
Other cases have involved access to modern forms of communi-
cation, such as the radio/4 the telephone,25 the cable television 
platform,26 and the internet.27 
Michael Curtis describes in detail the attempts by the anti-
slavery movement to gain access to the postal service (pp. 155-
175) and to public meeting halls (pp. 140, 244-250) in order to 
spread their beliefs to the general public. In 1835 President Jack-
son's Postmaster General Amos Kendall took the position that 
the Post Office was obligated to obey the laws of southern states 
that outlawed the distribution of antislavery publications. (p. 
158) President Jackson went even further, and proposed the 
adoption of a federal law that would "prohibit, under severe 
penalties, the circulation in the Southern States, through the 
17. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315,326 (1951) (Black, J., dissenting). 
18. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 
536 (1965); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969). 
19. Edwards, 372 U.S. at 232-233. 
20. Cox, 379 U.S. at 550. 
21. See Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
22. See ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992). 
23. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, Inc., v. Village of Stratton, 122 
S.Ct. 2080 (2002). 
24. See F. C. C. v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Red Lion Broadcasting 
v. F. C. C., 395 u.s. 367 (1969). 
25. See Sable Communicalions v. F. C. C., 492 U.S. 115 (1989). 
26. See Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. F.C.C., 520 U.S. 180 (1997); Denver 
Area Educalional Telecommunicalions Consortium, Inc. v. F. C. C., 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
27. See Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844 (1997); Ashcroft v. A.C.L.U., 122 S.Ct. 1700 
(2002). 
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mail, of incendiary publications .... " (p. 159) Similarly, the pub-
lic officials of Boston initially refused to allow abolitionists to 
use Faneuil Hall for a public meeting (p. 244 ), and a mob burned 
down Pennsylvania Hall in Philadelphia, which had been dedi-
cated to the discussion of public issues, particularly slavery (p. 
248) Curtis describes the debate in Congress over Jackson's bill, 
and people's reaction to the denial of access to public meeting 
halls. Congress rejected the postal act (p. 174 ), while a Boston 
newspaper insisted that "Faneuil Hall is common property for 
the purposes of free meetings of the citizens, as much as the 
streets are common property for citizens to walk in." (p. 245) In 
these disputes we may trace the origins of the public forum doc-
trine and the emerging doctrine of protecting access to the 
means of mass communication. 
6. FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS A "PRIVILEGE" OF UNITED 
STATES CITIZENSHIP. 
In numerous quotations from speeches, resolutions, and 
newspaper articles, Curtis demonstrates that in the 191h Century 
the popular understanding of the word "privilege" was equiva-
lent to the present term "fundamental right," and that freedom 
of expression was commonly referred to as a "privilege." (pp. 57, 
189, 217, 230, 236, 269, 287, 315, 320, 321, 323) Furthermore, it is 
clear that by the end of the Civil War many Americans, includ-
ing the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment, regarded free-
dom of speech as a "privilege" of American citizenship. (p. 361, 
364-368) As a conse~uence, the Supreme Court erred in the 
Slaughterhouse Casei in 1873 when it narrowly construed the 
privileges of national citizenship under the Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (p. 374), and it has 
persisted in that error to the present day by failing to overrule 
the reasoning of the Slaughterhouse decision. 
7. THE REMEDY FOR BAD SPEECH IS MORE SPEECH. 
Oliver Wendell Holmes and Louis Brandeis are justly cred-
ited with introducing the "counterspeech" principle into First 
Amendment jurisprudence. In 1919 Holmes stated that "the best 
test of truth is ... to get itself accepted in the competition of the 
market,"29 while in 1927 Brandeis explained that "[i]f there be 
28. Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36,75-80 (1873). 
29. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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time to expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies, to 
avert the evil by the processes of education, the remedy to be 
applied is more speech, not enforced silence. "30 This same prin-
ciple was articulated by both William Seward and Senator Oliver 
Smith during the debate over suppression of antislavery speech. 
(201, 253) 
8. THERE IS NO ORTHODOXY HERE. 
"If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, 
it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be or-
thodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opin-
ion .... "31 Justice Jackson's ringing declaration in the 1943 
Barnette case echoed the statements of Americans who were op-
posed to the Sedition Act (p. 100) or who advocated antislavery 
views (pp. 158, 172, 205) that government was powerless to pre-
scribe what shall be orthodox. As one anti-Sedition newspaper 
sarcastically noted, "By influence of Sedition and Alien Bills all 
Americans will be one side, and a tranquility will prevail all over 
the United States, similar to that so happily enjoyed in Constan-
tinople." (p. 72) 
9. THE GOVERNMENT MAY NOT "PICK SIDES" BY 
PROSECUTING ONE SIDE OF A DEBATE AND NOT 
THE OTHER. 
Viewpoint based laws restricting speech are unconstitu-
tional.32 The principal reason that the Supreme Court struck 
down a municipal ordinance outlawing "hate speech" in 1992 
was the danger that government would force people to speak in 
a politically correct manner.33 Laws that forbid the burning of 
the American flag34 or wearing a black armband to school as a 
war protese5 also suffer from the defect of being viewpoint 
based. 
30. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377 (1927). 
31. West Virginia State Bd of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943). 
32. See R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 {1992). In contrast, laws that 
subsidize one viewpoint over another may be constitutional, because government itself is 
entitled to take a point of view. See National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 
569,598-99 {1998) (Scalia, J. concurring). 
33. See R.A. V., 505 U.S. at 391-392 (stating "In its practical operation, moreover, 
the ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint dis-
crimination .... St. Paul has no such authority to license one side of a debate to fight 
freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry rules."). 
34. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,414 (1989). 
35. See Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Sch. District, 393 U.S. 503 {1969). But 
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Curtis describes at some length how the Sedition Act was 
carefully drawn to outlaw criticism solely of Federalist officials 
(p. 59), and provided for prosecution before juries carefully se-
lected by Federalist officers. (pp. 67, 90) It protected incumbents 
and jailed challengers. (p. 97) Government officials were pro-
tected from libel but not from flattery. (pp. 99) "[T]he press is 
open to those who will praise, while the threats of the law hang 
over those who blame the conduct of men in power." (p. 90) 
Similarly, the gag rule in the antebellum Congress, the statutes 
forbidding dissemination of antislavery literature, and the prose-
cution of Clement Vallandigham were all viewpoint based. 
10. STATEMENTS OF FACf MAY BE FALSE, BUT STATEMENTS 
OF OPINION CANNOT BE FALSE. 
The Supreme Court has expressly recognized that while 
statements of fact may be false and therefore actionable as 
defamation, statements of opinion are never punishable as de-
famatory. In 1974 the Court stated: "Under the First Amend-
ment there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious 
an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other 
ideas. But there is no constitutional value in false statements of 
fact."36 The distinction between statements of fact and state-
ments of opinion is now a touchstone of constitutional law. But 
this principle was not immediately obvious to 19th Century 
America. The distinction between fact and opinion and protec-
tion for freedom of opinion was asserted as a defense in the sedi-
tion cases (pp. 70, 73, 77, 83, 90, 97, 101), in the battle over anti-
slavery speech (pp. 166, 237), and in the prosecution of C.L. 
Vallandigham. (p. 322) 
11. SPEECH IS NOT CONDUCf. 
The opponents of antislavery speech repeatedly character-
ized it with metaphors of fire and violence. Antislavery speakers 
are "the midnight incendiary who fires the dwelling of his en-
emy, and listens with pleasure to the screams of his burning vic-
tims" (p. 179), or "a man who should throw a lighted torch into 
your house at midnight." (p. 157) Curtis notes that "[i]mplicit in 
such metaphors was the idea that the South was living on a pow-
see United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (upholding conviction for burning a 
draft card as antiwar protest). 
36. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-340 (1974). 
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der keg" (p. 182) and that abolitionists were applying the 
"spark." (p. 275) Antislavery advocates were described as firing 
a mortar over state lines (p. 202) or as breaking open cages of 
wild beasts and setting them on the populace (p. 246) and were 
characterized as "cutthroats and assassins." (p. 290) 
These metaphors are misleading because they blur the dis-
tinction between speech and conduct. Critics of the Sedition Act 
distinguished between opinion and action (pp. 75, 92), and ar-
gued that the mere tendency of speech to bring about social un-
rest is not sufficient grounds to suppress it. (p. 92) In the 20th 
Century the Supreme Court eventually rejected the "bad ten-
dency" tese7 and adopted the view of Holmes38 and Brandeis39 
that speech may be punished only if it is likely to incite an im-
mediate and serious violation of the law.40 
12. MORE PROTECTION IS ACCORDED FOR SPEECH 
INVOLVING MATTERS OF PUBLIC CONCERN THAN FOR 
MATTERS INVOLVING PRIVATE INDIVIDUALS ONLY. 
Over the last half century the Supreme Court has in many 
cases recognized that speech on matters of public concern is enti-
tled to more constitutional protection than speech that merely 
injures the reputation of private individuals.4 The most recent 
invocation of this principle occurred in Bartnicki v. Vopper42 
where the Supreme Court held that a radio station that broad-
cast a private conversation that had been illegally recorded by 
another person could not be punished because the conversation 
involved a matter of public concern.43 
37. An example of the "bad tendency" test is contained in Shaffer v. United States, 
255 F. 886, 888 (9th Cir. 1919). 
38. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting, stating that only speech 
that "is intended to produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about forth-
with certain substantive evils" may be punished.). 
39. See Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring, stating that speech 
may be punished only where evil to be averted is "probab[le]," "imminent," and "rela-
tively serious.") 
40. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that advocacy of 
violence may be punished only where such advocacy "is directed to inciting or producing 
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action." 
41. Compare New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (defamation of a 
public figure regarding matters of public concern); with Gertz, 418 U.S. 323 (1974) 
(defamation of a private figure regarding matters of public concern); and with Dun & 
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749 (1985) (defamation of a private figure 
regarding matters of private concern). 
42. 532 u.s. 514 (2001). 
43. See id. at 534 ("privacy concerns must give way when balanced against the in-
terest in publishing matters of public importance."). 
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The Sedition Act treated criticism of government officials as 
libel, but the opponents of the Act distinguished between defa-
mation of a person's private character and criticism of his official 
acts. (pp. 86, 90, 98, 102, 103) Similarly, the State of Maryland 
prosecuted and imprisoned William Lloyd Garrison for criminal 
libel after he condemned a shipowner for engaging in the slave 
trade. (p. 199) Garrison responded that he had the right "to in-
terrogate the moral aspect and public utility" of trafficking in 
slaves. (p. 200) Another critic made the same argument against 
the proposed ban on carrying antislavery materials through the 
mails, distinguishing between speech that slanders the character 
of individuals with speech that examines the conduct of public 
men. (p. 167) 
13. FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS NOT LIMITED TO FREEDOM 
FROM PRIOR RESTRAINTS; IT ALSO INCLUDES FREEDOM 
FROM SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENT. 
In 1769 William Blackstone contended that the English law 
of freedom of the press included only freedom from prior re-
straints, and afforded no protection against subsequent punish-
ments. (p. 45) In other words, although government could not 
prevent a person from speaking or writing, once words were ut-
tered or published the speaker or writer was subject to fine or 
imprisonment. This was the view of those who supported the Se-
dition Act. (pp. 65, 97) But opponents of the Sedition Act ridi-
culed this view (p. 71 ), in part because "the nature of the repub-
lican government requires broader protection for freedom of 
speech and press than that permitted in England." (p. 103) 
14. THE PUNISHMENT OF SPEECH FOR WHAT SEEMS TO BE 
JUSTIFIABLE REASONS ALSO CHILLS PROTECTED SPEECH. 
Critics of the Sedition Act argued that the law would not 
only punish those who publish falsehoods, but also people who 
"may honestly and innocently err in their political sentiments." 
(p. 90) As a result, it would "inspire the mind with terror" (99-
100) and people "would be afraid of publishing the truth .... " 
(p. 69) Although truth was a defense to violation of the Sedition 
Act, it was noted that it was often difficult to prove truth to the 
satisfaction of a court. (pp. 69, 97) "In vain shall we attempt to 
estimate the precise extent of prohibition, or ascertain what we 
are permitted to speak, and at what point we are compelled to 
silence." (p. 100) These concerns presage the recognition by the 
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Supreme Court that freedom of expression needs "breathing 
space to survive."44 
15. THE MAJORITY SHOULD ACCORD FREEDOM OF SPEECH TO 
THE MINORITY, FOR TOMORROW IT MAY FIND ITSELF IN 
THE MINORITY. 
Each of the major free speech disputes described by Cur-
tis-over the Sedition Act, antislavery agitation, and antiwar agi-
tation-contributed to a growing appreciation that the minority 
should be accorded freedom of expression. After 1800 the Fed-
eralist Party learned first-hand why the party in power should re-
frain from suppressing the rights of the opposition. As one 
newspaper put it after Lovejoy was shot, "Let one editor be shot 
for attempting to print a newspaper for a minority, and none are 
safe, for majorities are very fluctuating, and what is unpopular 
to-day may be popular to-morrow." (p. 238) Following years of 
struggle against mob violence, the gag rule, and the limits on the 
use of the post office the newly formed Republican Party stood 
for freedom of expression (p. 255) and ran under this slogan in 
1856: "Free Speech, Free Press, Free Men, Free Labor, Free 
Territory, and Fremont." (p. 281) Finally, in reaction to the mili-
tary's attempt to silence antiwar agitation under the Lincoln ad-
ministration, both Democrats (pp. 321-325) and Republicans 
(pp. 326-329) came to believe that the dominant party was not 
constitutionally permitted to stifle opposing views, and Lincoln 
was forced to rescind these actions by the force of public opin-
ion. (p. 352) 
16. WHEN FREEDOM OF SPEECH IS SUPPRESSED BY 
VIOLENCE, CHANGE MAY BE BROUGHT ABOUT ONLY 
THROUGH VIOLENCE. 
One of the principal stories that Curtis tells is of the publi-
cation, dissemination, and suppression of the book The Impend-
ing Crisis of the South: How to Meet It, by Hinton Rowan 
Helper. (pp. 1-2, 271-288) Helper's book was addressed to non-
slaveholders of the South, and it contained economic and moral 
arguments against slavery. Helper intended to create an anti-
slavery political party in the South. Chapter 12 of Curtis' book 
describes the frantic efforts of southern authorities to suppress 
Helper's book, while Chapter 13 (pp. 289-299) describes the per-
44. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,433 (1963). 
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secution of Reverend Daniel Worth of North Carolina for circu-
lating Helper's book. 
Helper, like Elijah Lovejoy, sought to change minds and 
bring about revolutionary though peaceful change through the 
ballot. But the alternative to peaceful change is violent revolu-
tion. As Francis Lieber wrote to John C. Calhoun, 
If you fear discussion, if you maintain that the South cannot 
afford it, then you admit at the same time that the whole insti-
tution is to be kept up by violence only, and is against the 
spirit of the times and unameliorable, which means, in other 
words, that violence supports it, and violence will be its end. 
(p. 193) 
Curtis' story of the suppression of the antislavery movement 
in the South raises a fascinating "what if." What if the South had 
allowed free discussion of emancipation and abolition? Would 
nonslaveholders-the vast majority of white southerners-have 
eventually perceived that slavery was not in their best interest? 
Would the Republican Party have gained adherents and votes in 
the South? Would slavery have been abolished without blood-
shed? Would the Civil War have been avoided? 
Similarly, after the Civil War, if there had been no reign of 
terror by the Klan and others, if African Americans had been 
accorded the right to organize and vote, would Mississippi and 
other southern states have become bastions of the Republican 
Party, and would the civil rights movement have peacefully ma-
tured as a political organization centered in the South a century 
earlier? 
II. THE ROLE OF HISTORY AND TRADITION IN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Leading justices of the United States Supreme Court have 
observed that history and tradition wield a powerful influence on 
the Court's interpretation of the Constitution. Oliver Wendell 
Holmes traced the importance of tradition to the fact that the 
Constitution is "a constituent act" 45 that "called into life a being 
the development of which could not have been foreseen com-
pletely by the most gifted of its begetters."46 In light of that, 
Holmes said that "[t]he case before us must be considered in the 
light of our whole experience and not merely in that of what was 
45. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416,433 (1920). 
46. Id 
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said a hundred years a9o .... We must consider what this coun-
try has become .... "4 Likewise, Felix Frankfurter observed 
that: 
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government 
cannot supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give 
meaning to the words of a text or supply them. It is an inad-
missibly narrow conception of American constitutional law to 
confine it to the words of the constitution and to disregard the 
gloss which life has written upon them.48 
In particular, the Court considers tradition to be the touch-
stone for determining what our fundamental rights are. Benja-
min Cardozo defined our fundamental rights as those which are 
"so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be 
ranked as fundamental."49 In recent years Chief Justice Warren 
Burger refused to accord constitutional protection to gay rights 
on the ground that to do so "would be to cast aside millennia of 
moral teaching"50 Similarly, Chief Justice William Rehnquist re-
jected the right to assisted suicide because "this asserted right 
has no place in our Nation's traditions .... "51 
Perhaps the most common definition of fundamental right 
used today is Justice Lewis Powell's formula from Moore v. City 
of East Cleveland,52 in which he said that our fundamental rights 
are those which are "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and 
tradition."53 But Justice Byron White, dissenting in that case, ar-
ticulated the central drawback to relying on tradition to define 
fundamental rights. Justice White said, "What the deeply rooted 
traditions of the country are is arguable; which of them deserve 
!he protection of the Due Process Clause is even more debat-
able."54 And Justice John Harlan, in his celebrated dissent from 
the Court's denial of certiorari in Poe v. Ullman/5 identified the 
core of the problem to be the fact that our Nation has often had 
competing traditions, and the role of the Court is to seek a bal-
ance among them. In Poe, Harlan stated that due process repre-
47. Id at 433-34. 
48. Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610 (1952) (Frankfurter, J. 
concurring). 
49. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,325 (1937). 
50. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,197 (1986) (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
51. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,703 (1997). 
52. 431 u.s. 494 (1977). 
53. Id at 503. 
54. Id at 549. 
55. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). 
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sents "the balance struck by this country, having regard to what 
history teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well 
as the traditions from which it broke. That tradition is a living 
thing."56 
If we heed the admonitions of Holmes, Cardozo, Frank-
furter, Harlan, Powell, White, Burger, and Rehnquist, it would 
behoove us to learn about our Nation's history to truly under-
stand the Constitution. The Constitution is not only its text-it is 
not only what the Framers understood it to mean-it is not only 
what the Supreme Court has said that the Constitution means-
its meaning must also be gleaned from how our people have be-
haved for generation after generation. It is this history that truly 
reveals the meaning of the Constitution and the fundamental 
values of Americans. 
The study of the First Amendment in particular suffers from 
a lack of careful and thorough historical examination. One of the 
most famous scholarly works on the First Amendment is Robert 
Bork's Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Prob-
lems.57 Although purporting to be an analysis of the original in-
tent of the framers of the First Amendment, Bork denigrated 
that intent, stating "The first amendment, like the rest of the Bill 
of Rights, appears to have been a hastily drafted document upon 
which little thought was expended."58 
There are a number of excellent casebooks on the First 
Amendment,59 however the principal focus of most of these 
books60 essentially begins in 1919 with the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Schenck v. United States,61 where Holmes first articulated 
the "clear and present danger" doctrine.62 If one has a Court-
centered understanding of Constitutional Law-that the Consti-
56. Id at 542 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
57. Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 
Ind. L.J. 1 (1971). 
58. See id at 22. 
59. See, e.g., Eugene Volokh, The First Amendment: Problems, Cases, and Policy 
Arguments (Foundation Press, 2001); Steven H. Shiffrin and Jesse H. Choper, The First 
Amendment: Cases, Comments, Questions (West Group, 3rd ed. 2001); William W. Van 
Alstyne, The American First Amendment in the Twenty-First Century: Cases and Materi-
als (Foundation Press, 3rd ed. 2002). 
60. Van Alstyne devotes an introductory chapter to historical issues including the 
Patterson case, Blackstone's views on freedom of the press, protections for freedom of 
expression in the original Constitution, the nation's experience under the Sedition Act, 
and other matters. Van Alstyne, The American First Amendment in the Twenty-First Cen-
tury at 1-33 (cited in note 59). 
61. 249 u.s. 47 (1919). 
62. Id at 52. 
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tution is what the Supreme Court says it is-then this approach 
makes perfect sense. The Supreme Court virtually ignored the 
First Amendment for a century after its adoption, and when it 
did finally turn its attention to freedom of expression the Court 
was hostile.63 Not until 1957 in Yates v. United States64 did the 
Supreme Court embrace the Holmes-Brandeis rationale that dis-
tinguished advocacy from incitement.65 
But prior to Yates-prior to Schenck-even prior to the 
Civil War-this Nation had examined the role of freedom of ex-
pression in an ordered society in a number of contexts and had 
committed itself to a broad definition of that freedom. In this 
book Michael Kent Curtis fills the gap between Jefferson and 
Lincoln with stories of courage, drama, and sacrifice. 
CONCLUSION 
Like many Americans, I suffered from the "Mount Rush-
more" vision of American History. Under this limited view, Ire-
vered Washington and Jefferson, adored Lincoln, and admired 
Teddy (who belongs on a mountain in a national monument), 
but I pressed the mental "fast forward" button through the 
dreary presidencies that punctuated the periods between these 
great men. Like the Elizabethans, we like our heads of state to 
be larger than life, Shakespearian figures around whom the 
drama revolves. But just as American history is not merely or 
primarily the history of Presidents, American Constitutional 
Law is not the merely or primarily the decisions of the Supreme 
Court. As Michael Curtis states, "[F]ree speech is too important 
to leave exclusively to judges, lawyers, and politicians. It belongs 
to the American people." (p. 21) 
Curtis' book The People's Darling Privilege reinforces the 
fundamental principle upon which this nation was founded-that 
governments are instituted by us to secure our inalienable rights, 
and that all just powers of government are derived from our con-
sent. The stories that Michael Curtis tells drive home the lesson 
that to make these self-evident truths manifest it is necessary 
that all persons be free to fully express themselves on matters of 
public concern. Without freedom of speech, democracy is impos-
sible. 
63. See Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1908) (Holmes, J.). 
64. 354 u.s. 298 (1957). 
65. See id at 324-25. 
